Digital arrest is not a legal power in India. It is a fraud technique in which criminals impersonate police, CBI, ED, courts or other authorities, keep victims on calls and pressure them to transfer money.

The scale of the problem is now large enough to justify looking beyond individual scams and asking how the money moves after a victim pays. Recent CBI and ED actions show a recurring architecture: mule bank accounts, shell entities, intermediaries and cross-border channels can turn one frightened victim payment into a distributed financial trail.

What the government says

India’s National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal advisory says criminals impersonate agencies including police, CBI, RBI and ED, fabricate allegations and use video calls to confine victims psychologically. The advisory states there is no concept of digital arrest under Indian law and tells victims to report financial cybercrime through 1930 and the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal.

I4C advisory on digital arrest scams

The money does not stop with the first account

CBI Operation Chakra actions show why the account receiving a victim’s first transfer can be only one layer. In a September 2026 operation, the agency searched 89 locations across 20 states in three digital-arrest cases involving alleged fraud of ₹42.36 crore and arrested three people accused of receiving, layering and dispersing proceeds.

Investigators seized banking records and digital devices and were tracing beneficiaries and handlers. One alleged mule account received ₹1.95 crore and transferred money onward the same day; another firm account allegedly received ₹1.5 crore. These are allegations under investigation, not findings of guilt.

The Goa case shows how large a network can become

The Enforcement Directorate describes a separate Goa digital-arrest investigation in which one victim’s alleged ₹2.60 crore loss led investigators to a network that, according to the agency, moved more than ₹27,850 crore through bank accounts and had links to 163 FIRs across 20 states and Union Territories.

That figure needs careful interpretation. It is a reported transaction volume associated with the network, not a claim that ₹27,850 crore was stolen from one victim or that every transaction represents criminal proceeds.

Directorate of Enforcement investigation releases

Why mule accounts are the accountability bottleneck

The public sees the impersonator. Investigators need to follow the account receiving the money, the person who controls that account, the next transfer, cash withdrawals, crypto conversion, hawala or overseas movement, and the communications connecting each layer.

This creates control questions for banks and payment intermediaries: how quickly are suspicious accounts frozen, how effectively are repeated pass-through transactions detected, and how often does a beneficiary account appear across unrelated complaints?

What victims should do

Anyone receiving a threat of arrest over a video call should end the call and independently contact the alleged agency through an official channel. Do not transfer money to prove innocence or pay supposed bail. For a financial cybercrime, report immediately on 1930 and the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal.

What investigators still need to establish

• How mule accounts are recruited and verified.
• Which intermediaries repeatedly appear across separate complaints.
• How quickly banks identify and freeze suspicious transfers.
• Which transactions move into cash, crypto or overseas networks.
• How telecom, payment and platform data can connect apparently separate scam teams.
• How much money is ultimately recovered for victims.

Evidence trail

News On AIR: CBI Operation Chakra-VI

Supreme Court order on digital arrest victims

TruthWave editorial note: This investigation distinguishes agency allegations, reported transaction figures and established legal facts. The accused are presumed innocent unless and until a court establishes guilt.